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orrepresentaspectsofnatureorthe language-user'sowngeneral orcircumstantialexperience. In
his book Professor Bazerman rarely avoids assuming as obvious the distinction between
language and that which language is about, so that statements like the following are typical:
"Experimental reports attach themselves to the nature that surrounds the text through the
representation ofthe doings, orexperiment" (p. 62). It is not hard to see that ifone assumesthat
scientific language is about something else, one is left with little to say about that "something
else", for it becomes the choice between two ontological danglers, "experiences" and "things in
themselves"-language, apparently, is either about the one or the other. Nor is one left with
much to say about language, ifit is seen merely as conductive ofknowledge rather than integral
to it.
Yet, on reflection, nobody reading a scientific article today, whether an account of an
experiment in laser optics or a theory of turbulent flow around two-dimensional bluffbodies,
thinks that the sense ofthe article (oritsprimaryfunction) consistsinreferring to orrepresenting
some past or potential state of affairs. (It would be rather like thinking that numerals and
operators of arithmetic are about numbers and operations.) Steven Shapin's sense of"virtual
witnessing", a style ofwriting experiments he attributed to Robert Boyle in an article in 1984,
brings us closer to a correct conception ofthe function oflanguage. What makes the reader a
virtual witness is that he sees the experiment carried out in front ofhim in language, hedoes not
see language reaching out to some other realm. (Alternatively, think of language as a calculus
with which one does science.) But even though an update on fundamentals would have been
welcome, Bazerman does not actually need an attitude on language-world dualism since he
intends to argue a very different case, that throughout history scientists have spent their time
grappling with the conventions oflanguage andcommunication. His views emergepiecemeal in
a series ofwell-researched and interesting case studies. In the one on Newton he argues that the
Opticks "is far from the spontaneous workings of the creative mind. The book is a hard-won
literary achievement forged through some trying literary wars" (p. 124). A large part of what
constitutes winning a literary war in science according to Bazerman (and what constituted
Boyle's genius according to Shapin), is convincing the relevant community that there isjust one
language in which the common problems of the subject can be expressed properly, and that it
should be preferred over others in use.
The one-against-many literary wars are the exception, ofcourse, but through them one may
come to see that gradual changes to the literary devices of science, what Bazerman calls "the
development oflinguistic means for statements that move toward relatively stable meaning and
assent among people sharing wide numbers ofsocial variables(even while sharing participation
inscientificactivity)" (p. 13), betray aconstantstrugglein thehistory ofscience atalevel which is
easy to miss. For example, his chapter on 'The changing account of scientific doings in the
Philosophical Transactionsofthe RoyalSociety, 1665-1800' should be understood as ananalysis
atthatlevel. Professor Bazerman, who teachescomposition at the CityUniversity ofNewYork,
is a finewriteralthough his arguments would have benefited had hekept the book to two-thirds
ofits length. It may still lead a few to revise their ideas about what needs explaining and what
constitutes explanation in the history of science.
Alexander Zahar, Wellcome Institute
FRANCOIS DUCHESNEAU, Genese de la theorie cellulaire, Collection Analytiques 1,
Montreal, Editions Bellarmin, and Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1987, 8vo, pp. 388,
illus., Can $25.00.
Despite the importance ofcell theory in nineteenth-century biology, it has received relatively
little historical attention. This volume provides a synthesis of the origins of cell theory in the
period between 1824, when Dutrochet formulated a theory of the common structural units of
plants and animals, and 1856, when Virchow pronounced his theory of continuous cell
division-omnis cellula e cellula. Duchesneau argues that hitherto accounts oftheorigins ofcell
biology have been positivistic, seeing developments as responses to improved observations and
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techniques. Instead he emphasizes theoretical aspects ofdiverse views ofthe cell, and provides
an exposition of the views of major contributors to the debate on structural units following
Dutrochet. There are accounts ofthe ideas of Raspail, Muller, Schwann, Remak, and Kolliker
as well as Virchow. Duchesneau traces a shift from an anti-vitalistic programme to Muller's
emphasis on the living organism. A welcome feature ofthe book is the attempt to relate French
and German cell biology, so correcting the distortions of earlier German accounts of the
history of cell biology as a German national achievement. Yet in relying on a textual
exposition, no attempt is made to assess the transmission and influence ofthe various theories,
to locate cellular research in the various institutional settings, or to consider the interaction
between observational techniques and theories. Archival sources and editions of letters have
not been used. Scientific innovations seem to have taken place in a cultural and social vacuum
with no reference being made to how, for example, Raspail and Virchow related their political
radicalism to their scientific endeavours. The neglect of these broader dimensions means that,
despite the author's erudition, a definitive history of the origins and early years ofcell theory
has yet to be written.
Paul Weindling, Wellcome Unit, Oxford
JURGEN SANDMANN, Der Bruch mit der humanitaren Tradition: die Biologisierung der
Ethik bei Ernst Haeckel und anderen Darwinisten seiner Zeit, Forschungen zur neueren
Medizin- und Biologiegeschichte 2, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur Mainz,
Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer, 1990, 8vo, p. 218, DM 88.00.
The Nazis (and certain historians of Nazism) claimed that the German Darwinist Ernst
Haeckel (1834-1919) was a precursor of their belief in racial struggle, the unity of man and
nature, and a eugenically-based morality. Others have pointed out that Haeckel was a popular
inspiration for liberals, socialists, feminists, and pacifists. In this conflict, Haeckel's substantial
scientific achievements in embryology have been overlooked. A balanced scholarly
reconstruction of the development of Haeckel's opinions on social and ethical issues is also
long overdue. In an attractively-produced monograph, Sandmann has attempted to analyse
Haeckel's voluminous publications. The results are not wholly convincing.
Sandmann claims that from his youth Haeckel was a mechanistic materialist, who by 1870
had formulated an inhumane creed ofSocial Darwinism; forexample, he advocated euthanasia
ofbabies with birth defects and socio-biological rationales for executing murderers. Haeckel is
seen as elaborating an anti-Christian and naturalistic code of scientific ethics in his writings.
Unfortunately, Sandmann's grasp of historical methodology is poor. His account is a highly
selective "scissors and paste" compilation ofquotations suiting his thesis. No attempt is made
to consider other strands ofHaeckel's thinking, or his greatchanges inemphasis over the years.
Thus differences of opinion between Haeckel and the scientific materialists Buchner and
Moleschott are overlooked, as are features of Haeckel's thinking that were consistent with
Johannes Muller's anti-mechanistic organicism. Indeed, Haeckel continued to criticize
mechanists like His. Haeckel's use ofembryological explanations ofdevelopment should have
been scrutinized as these emphasize processes ofthe division oflabour and organic integration
rather than Darwinian natural selection. Given that he derived the concept of the "cell state"
from Virchow (a noted liberal), perhaps Haeckel was less ofan original thinker than Sandmann
claims. There is no analysis ofthe use ofsocial analogies in Haeckel's scientific work, although
his researches into embryology provide a key for many ofhis views on psychology and society.
Sandmann fails to detect changing opinions on Christianity and the emergence ofpantheistic
sympathies by the 1890s. An artificially simplified image is maintained. Sandmann has not used
any ofthe extensive archival sources in Haeckel'shouse, the Villa Medusa inJena, which would
have enabled him to present a more nuanced and historically convincing account. The selection
of "other Darwinists" mentioned in the title is limited to a few monists. No consideration is
given to such major figures among Haeckel's students as Semon (a Jew although Sandmann
claims that Haeckel was an anti-Semite) and Oscar Hertwig, about whom amonograph is long
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